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Temporary Services and 
Contracting Out
Effects on Low-Skilled Workers
emporary help employment grew 
dramatically over the last decade, 
accounting for 10 percent of net 
employment growth in the United States 
during the 1990s. Evidence from case 
studies and business surveys suggests 
dramatic growth in the outsourcing of 
functions to contract companies as well 
(Abraham and Taylor 1996; Houseman 
2001). Through case studies in a 
representative manufacturing, service, and 
public sector industry, we examined why 
employers are increasing the use of these 
nonstandard employment arrangements 
and the implications of this increased use 
for wages, benefits, and working 
conditions in low-skilled labor markets.
Temporary help and contract company 
workers perform work for a client, usually 
at the client's work site, but they are the 
legal employees of an agency or contract 
company. Because workers in these 
arrangements often receive lower 
compensation than they would if they 
were employees of the client 
organization, the growth of temporary 
help and contracting out generally is 
viewed as inimical to workers' interests. 
We find, however, that the story is not that 
simple. Our case study evidence points to 
circumstances in which workers are likely 
to be adversely affected by the
outsourcing of jobs to agencies or 
contractors. In other situations, however, 
the effects on low-skilled workers appear 
to be minimal, and in some situations they 
may even be beneficial.
Incidence of Temporary Help and 
Contracting Out
We studied the use of temporary 
services and contracting out in five 
Midwest automotive supply 
establishments, six hospitals in Michigan 
and North Carolina, and seven Michigan 
public school districts. 1 Low-skilled jobs 
comprise a large share of employment in 
all three of the industries studied. The 
majority of auto supply workers are in 
low- or semi-skilled production positions. 
Hospitals have shifted work away from 
high-skilled, high-paid registered nurses 
to low-skilled, low-paid nurse assistants. 
Moreover, hospitals utilize a large number 
of workers in low-skilled clerical, food 
service, and housekeeping positions. 
Typically, 15 to 20 percent of a public 
school's staff is in low- and semi-skilled 
noninstructional positions in such areas as 
food service, cleaning, and transportation.
The use of temporary agency help in 
low-skilled functional areas was common 
in our auto supply and hospital case 
studies. Contracting out low-skilled
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functions was prevalent in hospitals and 
public schools. Four out of the five auto 
supply plants utilized temporary agency 
help in production positions during the 
period of our interviews. Among the two 
Unionized plants in our study, the use of 
agency temporaries was strictly limited at 
one and prohibited at the other. In two 
nonunion plants, temporary employment 
accounted for over 20 percent of 
production employment.
Although most hospitals in our study 
kept poor records of their use of agency 
temporary help in support functions, they 
reported using agency temps in many 
low-skilled clinical, clerical, 
housekeeping, and food service positions. 
Data from the hospitals that did keep 
good records suggest a moderately high 
level of temporary employment. For 
instance, in one hospital, agency temps 
worked 11 percent of hours in food 
services, 5 percent of hours in 
housekeeping, and 14 percent of hours in 
clerical functions.
We observed several cases in public 
schools where noninstructional support 
services, including custodial, 
transportation, and food services 
operations, were entirely contracted out. 
Interestingly, however, it is quite common 
for hospitals and public schools to 
contract out only management functions 
and to keep workers on their payroll. 
Whereas all of the hospitals we studied 
contracted out the management of food 
services or housekeeping services, none 
contracted out the entire operation. 
Among public schools, two districts 
contracted out their entire food services 
operation, but three contracted out only 
the management function.
Implications for Workers
In several instances, management 
decisions to use agency temporaries or to 
contract out functions appeared to have a 
direct, adverse effect on the wages, 
benefits, or other working conditions of 
low-skilled workers.2 These cases 
involved the substitution of agency or 
contract company staff for regular 
employees on a long-term basis. 
Sometimes, contracting out entailed loss 
of union status and benefits, for affected 
workers, such as due process in grievance
procedures. The contracting out of an 
entire low-skilled function in public 
schools was always associated with lower 
benefits and sometimes lower wages for 
workers in these occupations. By law, 
public school employees received pension 
and other benefits, which were 
considerably more generous than those 
typically offered in the private sector to 
low-skilled workers. In addition, wage 
levels of contracted workers tended to be 
lower than those paid to school 
employees, who were often unionized. A 
1994 Michigan law precluding union 
bargaining over the contracting out of 
noninstructional services, coupled with 
financial pressures on public schools, 
have led to a recent surge of contracting 
out of these services.
In only one case that of an auto 
supplier did an employer use temporary 
agency workers on a long-term basis. This 
auto supplier screened all new hires
Unless an organization's low- 
skilled employees are earning 
above market compensation, 
management will have little to
gain in terms of wage and 
benefits cost savings from the use
of agency temporaries and
contractors. Where we observe
such use, the organization's
motivation is something else.
through a temporary help agency and 
offered them permanent positions after six 
months to a year or more far longer than 
other auto suppliers using temporary 
agencies for screening purposes. This 
nonunion supplier paid its regular workers 
wages and benefits comparable to 
unionized plants in the area, a strategy 
designed to improve the quality of its 
employees and to avoid unionization. 
However, in prolonging the probationary 
period in its hiring through a temporary 
agency, the company acknowledged 
substantial savings in wage and benefits 
costs.
Interestingly, the human resources 
directors at the unionized auto supplier 
plants also indicated that they would like
to be able to use temporary agency 
workers more to save on labor costs. 
However, unlike the situation in public 
schools, unions in this sector were able to 
prohibit or greatly restrict the use of 
temporary agencies through collective 
bargaining. These examples underscore 
the importance that laws governing 
collective bargaining have on the 
incidence of outsourcing and ultimately 
on compensation and other working 
conditions in an industry.
Although outsourcing is often 
associated with the substitution of agency 
or contract company workers for higher- 
paid regular workers, evidence from our 
case studies suggests that outsourcing 
typically did not involve such substitution 
on a permanent basis. Agency 
temporaries usually were hired on a short- 
term basis to fill in for an absent 
employee, to staff a temporary project, or 
to screen workers for permanent 
positions. Particularly in hospitals, 
agency temporaries' compensation was 
similar to that of regular staff in 
comparable positions; in a few cases, they 
even earned more.
Only the management function was 
contracted out in almost all of the 
instances of contracting out in hospitals 
and in about half of the instances in public 
schools, so the wages and benefits of low- 
skilled workers in these functional areas 
were unaffected. In these cases, schools 
and hospitals believed any wage and 
benefits cost savings from contracting out 
the entire function were non-existent or 
relatively small: the motivation for 
contracting out the management function 
was to achieve product or productivity 
improvements and cost savings in other 
areas.
The simple but important point is that 
unless an organization's low-skilled 
employees are earning above market 
compensation, management will have 
little to gain and workers will have little 
to lose in terms of wage and benefits 
cost savings from the use of agency 
temporaries and contractors. Where we 
observe such use, the organization's 
motivation is something else.
A caveat to this conclusion is that 
compensation among regular employees
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likely depends on the existence of 
competition from staffing agencies and 
contractors. It will be difficult for low- 
skilled workers and their union 
representatives to raise compensation if 
employers have the option of using low- 
cost third parties. We observed this sort 
of dynamic in one of our public school 
case studies. The previously mentioned 
state law, which precluded collective 
bargaining over the contracting out of 
noninstructional services, paved the way 
for this school district to contract out the 
custodial services in some of its buildings. 
The union was able to continue operating 
in half of the buildings, but only because 
it agreed to steep pay cuts for its higher- 
paid custodians and to the disciplining of 
poor performers.
Potential Benefit: The Case of Tempo 
rary Agencies and "Risky" Workers
When can workers actually benefit 
from a temporary agency or contract 
arrangement? Some workers, of course, 
prefer temporary positions. Workers may 
benefit from superior management skills 
provided by a contractor. More 
interesting is the use of temporary help 
agencies for screening purposes. Here, 
we argue, agency temporaries may benefit 
from the arrangement, even when they 
desire permanent positions and receive 
lower wages than direct hires.
The use of agency temporaries for 
screening purposes increased during the 
late 1990s among employers in our case 
studies as labor markets tightened and the 
average quality of job applicants dropped. 
Some of these employers began hiring 
workers for certain low-skilled positions 
exclusively through temporary agencies. 
Others used a mixed hiring strategy. For 
instance, one auto supplier directly hired 
applicants with good work histories while 
hiring others through a temporary agency 
at lower wages and lower cost to the 
company.
By lowering compensation and firing 
costs, temporary help agencies made it 
more attractive for companies to try out 
workers with criminal records, poor work 
histories, or otherwise "risky" 
characteristics. Because many of these 
workers might not otherwise have had the 
opportunity to audition for a permanent
position, they potentially benefited from 
the temporary employment arrangement.
At the same time, by lowering the 
companies' costs of trying out riskier 
workers, temporary help agencies 
effectively expand the supply of potential 
labor to a company. In this way, 
companies may avoid raising wages in 
order to attract more qualified candidates. 
Furthermore, because increases in wages 
for new workers are almost always 
accompanied by increases in wages for 
existing workers, the more general use of 
agency temporaries may relieve upward 
wage pressure in tight labor markets. 3
Conclusion
Sometimes an organization's 
motivation for outsourcing low-skilled 
jobs is to substitute lower-paid temporary 
agency or contract company workers for 
regular employees. Often, however, an 
organization's motivation for outsourcing 
is unrelated to wage and benefits cost 
savings. Workers in low-skilled positions 
may already receive relatively low pay, 
and outsourcing involves no permanent 
substitution of temporary or contract 
company workers for regular employees. 
Except to the extent that the existence of 
an outsourcing option inhibits 
compensation gains among low-skilled 
workers, contracting out and the use of 
agency temporaries has little apparent 
effect on low-skilled workers.
The growing use of temporary 
agencies to screen workers for permanent 
positions illustrates the complexity of 
assessing the impacts of temporary 
agency work on low-skilled workers. Our 
case study evidence suggests that often 
workers hired through agencies are 
deemed riskier than those hired directly, 
rendering simple wage comparisons 
between these two groups invalid. 
Moreover, the fact that temporary 
agencies sometimes lower compensation 
costs and facilitate dismissal may be the 
very reason some employers are willing 
to try out certain workers. The potentially 
more important impacts of temporary 
employment are on workers' subsequent 
employment and earnings. The extent to 
which temporary agencies help open 
doors to good jobs for low-skilled, risky 
workers or instead channel them into low-
paying, dead-end assignments is an 
important topic for future study.
Notes
1. We conducted extensive interviews with each 
organization's managers, temporary agency or con 
tract company representatives, and workers. We also 
collected data on employment, wages, and benefits 
by occupation for regular, temporary agency, and 
contract workers from each organization.
2. An obvious caveat to the conclusion that lower 
wages and benefits adversely affect workers is that 
lower compensation may increase employment and 
reduce unemployment in the long run. While these 
long-term impacts are hotly debated in the econom 
ics profession, we do not consider such macroeco- 
nomic effects here.
3. We develop these arguments, including why 
employers may need a third party to lower the costs 
of trying out risky workers, in Houseman, Kalle- 
berg, and Erickcek (2001).
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John S. Earle
he Russian transition from 
socialist planning toward market-based 
allocation provides an interesting 
opportunity to measure the role of the 
labor market in generating economic 
growth. A common but relatively little 
examined assumption of economists is 
that employment (or labor) allocation in 
market economies responds to 
productivity differentials across 
alternative uses, with labor tending to 
flow away from lower-valued uses and 
toward those that are higher-valued. 
During the Soviet period, however, jobs 
were allocated across industries and 
enterprises according to the dictates of 
central planners, who were in turn guided 
by the political leaders' preferences for 
developing some sectors and types of 
firms rather than others. For instance, the 
mining, heavy manufacturing, and public 
transportation industries received many 
resources, as did larger firms and those 
connected with the military, while the 
consumer goods manufacturing and 
service sectors, as well as smaller firms, 
tended to be neglected.
How well did the Soviet planners do, 
measured as the contribution of job 
reallocation across firms to increased 
productivity? And how has the 
relationship between job and productivity 
growth by industry changed since the 
dramatic liberalization of markets and the 
privatization of much of the economy in 
the early 1990s? To what extent have the 
patterns of job reallocation come to more 
closely resemble those found in the 
United States, and what factors tend to
increase the degree to which job 
reallocation is productivity-enhancing?
Analysis of recently available data on 
Russian firms provides some answers to 
these questions. The data cover all 
industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia in 
1985-1991 and all medium- and large- 
sized industrial enterprises since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991. 
Firms with fewer than 100 employees are 
excluded. The data, which provide 
information similar to that in the U.S. 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (except 
that they pertain to firms rather than 
establishments), are well suited for 
investigating the job reallocation process
in the old industrial sector that was 
established during the socialist period. 
The behavior of the old industrial firms  
where socialist planning resulted in a 
large concentration of capital and skilled 
labor, and where the price, technology, 
and competition shocks of transition have 
been particularly severe is of particular 
interest in Russia and other transition 
economies.
Labor Market Developments in 
Russian Industry
Figure 1 displays information on the 
evolution of industrial production, 
employment, labor productivity, and the 
real wage in Russia from 1990 to 2000. 
Although the large magnitude of the 
output decline in the early 1990s must be 
taken somewhat cautiously (chiefly due to 
problems in measuring inflation), the 
broad trends are well accepted. The 
"output shock" was especially severe in 
Russia, where official industrial 
production fell by more than 50 percent in 
just the first four years of the 1990s. The 
employment decline was also quite 
drastic by international and historical 
standards, with a fall of nearly 40 percent 
by 1998. Nevertheless, the drop in 
employment was more gradual than that
Figure 1 Production, Employment, Productivity, and Wages in Russian Industry, 
1990-2000
Index: 1990 = 100
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SOURCE: Russian State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat).
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of output, resulting in a large initial 
decline in labor productivity followed by 
a partial recovery. Measured real wages, 
here deflated by the official CPI, also fell 
in the years to 1995 and have been 
volatile since then.
The aggregate data show a clear 
picture of an industrial sector in deep 
depression during the 1990s. This raises 
questions concerning the nature of the 
decline. Does the rapid deindustrial- 
ization reflect a process of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction, whereby the 
economy gets rid of its over-built, 
inefficient elements? Or does the 
aggregate industrial decline reflect a 
depression in which all economic activity 
declines simultaneously and roughly 
proportionately? A final possibility is that 
the decline is actually more severe in the 
more productive sectors of the economy, 
suggesting sclerosis in an excessive 
preservation of inefficient jobs and 
unhealthy pressures on more productive 
firms and sectors. Sclerosis is quite 
plausible in Russia, where governments 
(particularly local and regional 
governments) may protect weak 
enterprises, successful firms are subject to 
public and private predation, and 
stripping of assets most likely from 
productive firms with valuable assets is 
notoriously widespread. Addressing 
these questions requires an analysis of 
firm-level data that permit an assessment 
of differences across firms and sectors in 
employment and productivity growth.
Firm-Level Job Flows
The firm-level analysis follows 
standard methodologies used in the 
United States for measuring job creation 
and job destruction, as the sources of 
growth and decline in employment at the 
firm level, respectively. The creation rate 
is defined as the ratio of employment 
growth in all expanding firms to total 
employment, and the destruction rate is 
the ratio of employment decline in all 
contracting firms to total employment. 
The reallocation rate a measure of the 
total movement of jobs across firms is 
defined as the sum of the creation and 
destruction rates. Figure 2 contains 
calculations of these rates on an annual
Figure 2 Job Creation and Job Destruction in Russia
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
-*- Creation rate -»- Destruction rate —A— Reallocation rate
SOURCE: Brown and Earle (2002).
basis for the Russian industrial sector 
from 1985 to 1999.
Job creation is low in this sector 
throughout the period, but it does rise 
significantly in the later years. If the 
years are grouped into a rough "pre- 
reform" period (1985-1991) and a "post- 
reform" period (1992-1999), the creation 
rate rises from an average of 1.4 percent 
in the first period to 2.4 percent in the 
second. Note that the grouping of years is 
defined around 1992, the year of the "big 
bang" liberalization in Russia.
Job destruction exceeds creation in 
every year, and it rises even much more in 
the early 1990s, reaching the typical 
range of the U.S. economy by 1992- 
1993. The gap between destruction and 
creation widens substantially, confirming 
the net employment decline in the official 
aggregate data. Comparing the pre- and 
post-reform periods, the average job 
destruction rate more than doubles, rising 
from 4.5 percent to 10.3 percent. As a 
consequence of the rise in both creation 
and destruction, the reallocation rate also 
rises, from an average of 5.9 percent in 
the pre-reform period to an average of 
12.7 post-reform.
Job Flows and Firm Characteristics
How do the patterns of job flows relate 
to observable firm characteristics? In 
research on the United States, a principal 
focus has been on variables that may be 
associated with costs of labor adjustment, 
such as size, capital intensity, average 
wage, and labor productivity. The general 
finding has been that each of these 
variables tends to reduce the magnitude of 
job reallocation. Analysis of the Russian 
data shows that these characteristics had 
an inconsistent relationship with these 
variables in the pre-reform period; 
however, all of these relationships moved 
strongly toward negative. This suggests 
that economic reforms have produced 
patterns of job flows more akin to those in 
market economies, and that Russian firms 
have become more sensitive to adjustment 
costs.
Of particular interest in the Russian 
transition are the effects of market 
competition and firm ownership on job 
reallocation. Employment movements 
may be taken as a measure of 
restructuring, which the policies of 
liberalization and privatization were 
intended to promote. The data, however, 
show no systematic tendency for firms of 
private ownership or those operating in
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less concentrated product markets to 
engage in higher levels of reallocation.
Productivity-Enhancing Job 
Reallocation
How is job reallocation related to 
productivity differentials across firms? 
Do less productive firms tend to lose jobs 
while the more productive tend to gain 
them? Or is there no relationship, or even 
possibly a negative one, between job 
flows and relative productivity levels?
These questions can be addressed 
using a decomposition of aggregate 
industrial labor productivity growth. Our 
analysis of the data suggests that while 
average firm productivity was falling in 
the post-reform period, which may be an 
artifact of overstated inflation, changes in 
the composition of Russian industry 
partially offset this effect. The changes in 
the relative employment shares of 
different industries and of firms within 
industries each worked to increase 
productivity by more than 2 percent per 
year, on average, in the post-reform 
period. Taken together, the two types of 
job flows produced nearly 5 percent 
annual productivity growth.
These results contrast starkly with 
those for the pre-reform period, when the 
estimated contributions of job flows to
productivity growth are actually negative. 
The magnitudes are tiny, implying that the 
reallocation of labor under Soviet 
planning was largely unrelated to 
productivity differentials.
Finally, what is the impact of firm 
characteristics, particularly ownership and 
competition, on the job flows and 
productivity growth? While private 
ownership and market dispersion have no 
tendency to raise the level of job 
reallocation, the analysis finds that they 
have strong positive effects on the 
relationship of reallocation with 
productivity differentials. This suggests 
that privatization and liberalization 
policies worked to focus job destruction 
in the firms and sectors that were the least 
productive in the Russian economy.
Conclusion
Basic economics teaches us that a 
primary function of the labor market is to 
allocate labor to its highest valued uses. 
In the simplest textbook case of 
homogeneous labor and perfect 
competition, efficiency requires that the 
marginal productivity of labor be equal in 
all firms and all sectors of the economy. 
In response to changes in the environment 
(such as shifting consumer demand, 
increased competition, or technological
innovation), an "efficient" labor market is 
supposed to facilitate adjustments that 
reallocate labor to raise productivity.
This study of the Russian labor market 
finds that prior to reforms, when Russia 
was governed by Soviet planners, the 
labor market functioning was not 
consistent with this textbook model. The 
movement of jobs across firms and 
sectors was largely unrelated to 
productivity differentials. After reforms, 
however, Russian labor market 
performance changed drastically, and job 
reallocation worked to raise productivity 
growth.
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